Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Economics

9-20-2018

Centrality and Cooperation in Networks
Boris van Leeuwen
Tilburg University

Abhijit Ramalingam
Appalachian State University

David Rojo Arjona
Chapman University, rojoarjo@chapman.edu

Arthur Schram
University of Amsterdam

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other
Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Leeuwen, B., Ramalingam, A., Arjona, D. R., & Schram, A. (2019). Centrality and cooperation in networks. Experimental Economics,
22(1), 178-196. doi: 10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Centrality and Cooperation in Networks
Comments

This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Experimental
Economics, volume 22, issue 1, in 2019 following peer review. The final publication is available at Springer via
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1.
Copyright

Economic Science Association

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles/214

Centrality and Cooperation in Networks
Boris van Leeuwen a, Abhijit Ramalingam b,
David Rojo Arjona c, Arthur Schram d
a

Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, Netherlands; b.vanleeuwen@uvt.nl
(Corresponding author) Department of Economics, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University,
Boone, NC, USA; ramalingama@appstate.edu, abhi.ramalingam@gmail.com
c
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA; rojoarjo@chapman.edu
d
Department of Economics, EUI (Florence) and CREED, University of Amsterdam; schram@uva.nl
b

August 2018

Abstract: We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with
centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our
experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further
participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute
significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this
tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
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Introduction

Many organizations and groups have some form of network structure defined by who can
interact with whom. Links between members are often formal. For example, a hierarchical
chain of command typically creates a well-defined network structure. Network links might,
however, also be of a more informal nature. Some individuals, for instance, might benefit from
information provided by others even if these others are not from the same formal organization.
Think of an employer A looking for suggestions from other employers about suitable
candidates to recruit (Gërxhani et al. 2013). Even if she is not involved in any formal
organization connecting her to other employers, A might receive suggestions from employer B
who happens to be her golf partner. In fact, if B knows employer C, A might even receive
information from C without knowing C. In this way, some individuals might connect others
who are otherwise separated. Separation can occur, for instance, by location or lack of direct
social connections. Individuals who connect others in this way are in a sense more ‘central’ in
the network than those who do not connect strangers.
Networks with central players might occur in formal organizations (for example,
connecting two departments of the same firm), but intuitively, they seem more likely to be
observed in informal organizations. This is because formal organizations typically try to avoid
specific individuals becoming too central. Indeed, if distinct subgroups are only connected via
a central player, then – in both formal and informal networks – her presence is essential for
these groups to mutually benefit from each other’s actions. In their study of 50 large
organizations, Cross and Prusak (2002) find that informal networks are ubiquitous, and that
such networks often have central players who play a crucial role by connecting other
individuals and subgroups in the organization.
At the same time, many organizations have mechanisms allowing members to be
expelled if they somehow fail in their obligations towards other members. An extreme example
would be how, historically, military personnel would face serious consequences (possibly
execution) if they shirked on the job. Less dramatic examples of exclusion are observed in
firms, political parties, supporters groups, and clubs. Managers can be fired, politicians can be
expelled, hooligans can be banned from visiting games, and club membership can be revoked.
In some cases, the impact of this exclusion can also be substantial to the group as a whole (e.g.
a complete government can fall due to the acts of a single politician). A common theme is that
exclusion from these groups is costly to the person involved and possibly also to the group as
a whole.
1

When the member’s position is characterized by centrality, however, her exclusion may
be even more costly to other members of the organization, who are now no longer connected.
The powerful position that centrality thus brings might then lead central players to exploit their
pivotal position with little fear of retaliation. Cross and Prusak (2002) find that ‘central
connectors’ sometimes “use their roles for political or financial gain” (p. 8). The notion of
centrality is closely related to the idea of structural holes in networks. In our framework a
central player bridges a structural hole, which enables her to extract the rents from this position
(Burt 1992; Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2007). This rent seeking is acceptable to those being
connected because the connections she creates are valuable. It is a price they might well be
willing to pay, as “it is not easy for the other members of the network to supplant an ineffective
central connector” (Cross and Prusak 2002, p. 8).
In this paper, we study how network positions affect cooperative behavior. We design
an experiment that allows us to study the effects of centrality and how this relates to the
possibility of excluding players from a network. Our setup creates a network where centrality
is valuable while cooperation can be enforced by the threat of exclusion. In particular, we
address the following research questions: (i) How is cooperative behavior affected by being
central in a network? (ii) How do other players respond to the use or (potential) abuse of a
central position?
In the experiment, subjects play a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game
where group members are connected on a network. Payoffs from individual contributions
accrue to all, without rivalry. As is usual in these games, full contribution by all members is
efficient but selfish individuals have a dominant strategy to free ride by contributing nothing.
In one of our treatments, contribution constitutes a public good because no group member can
be excluded from benefitting. An example is the collection of voluntary contributions amongst
neighbors, to install safety cameras at the neighborhood’s periphery. In another treatment
exclusion from group benefits is possible and contributions are best seen as constituting a
‘quasi’ or ‘impure’ public good (Cornes and Sandler 1996). Here, one can think of
contributions amongst members of a club to build a new clubhouse, where membership of noncontributors can be revoked.
The networks we design provide a formal structure on who can contribute and who
enjoys the benefits of any individual’s contribution. Without centrality the network is complete;
there is a connection between each pair of players. This means that a player’s departure from
the network has no consequences for the possibilities of the remaining players to interact and
benefit from each other’s contributions. With centrality, one player connects the other group
2

members. Note, however, that centrality only creates a pivotal role if the player concerned
could somehow leave or be removed from the network. This would break (some of) the
connections between other group members. To study the effects of network structures with
centrality, we therefore include a treatment with exclusion. Here, every player may vote to
exclude specific group members (as in Cinyabuguma et al. 2005 and Charness and Yang 2014).
Excluding the central player causes the group to fall apart, which is costly for all involved.1
Several other experimental studies investigate public good provision in a network. In
these studies, the network determines which contributions can be accessed (Rosenkranz and
Weitzel 2012; Charness et al. 2014), who can monitor whom (Eckel et al. 2010; Fatas et al.
2010), who can punish whom (Leibbrandt et al. 2015) or a combination of these (Carpenter et
al. 2012). However, none of these studies involves centrality. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to study the effects of network centrality in social dilemmas.
Our results show that centrality is often used as a license to free ride; central players
contribute less than others. Other players tolerate such behavior: they contribute more than the
central player and they tend not to vote to exclude central players. As a result, players with
centrality earn higher payoffs than others. In other words, we find that central players take
advantage of their position and manage to get away with this.
The introduction of players with centrality creates heterogeneity across players. This is
important, because homogeneity within organizations is unlikely to be found outside the
laboratory. People differ along many dimensions, including their position in the network. A
large body of previous work has found that heterogeneity in endowments, productivity and/or
returns frequently reduces cooperation in VCM games (e.g. Cherry et al. 2005, Anderson et al.
2008, Tan 2008, Nikiforakis et al. 2012, Fischbacher et al. 2014, Hargreaves Heap et al. 2016,
Gangadharan et al. 2017).2 This is primarily due to a multiplicity of norms that underlie the
behavior of players with different characteristics. The introduction of additional features such
as a punishment mechanism or the activation of group identity allows groups to overcome this
decrease in cooperation (Reuben and Riedl 2013, Weng and Carlsson 2015). However, not all
1

It is important to note that exclusion is not the only mechanism that might affect the structure of a network.
Many networks, for example, form endogenously with members joining and leaving at their own discretion.
Endogenous group formation has been shown to positively affect contributions in experimental public goods
environments (e.g., Ehrhart and Keser 1999, Coricelli et al. 2004, Page et al. 2005, Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007,
Ahn et al. 2008). The changes in network structure that arise from this endogeneity, however, will typically not
affect players’ centrality; the networks in such experiments are designed to be complete, with every pair of
members being directly linked. In contrast, our experimental networks either have one central player or have none.
This provides control over the centrality and allows for clean inferences on the effects of centrality on
contributions.
2
Several other papers also study heterogeneity in VCM games but have no baseline with homogenous players.
Examples include Buckley and Croson (2006), Noussair and Tan (2011) and Dekel et al. (2017).
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additional mechanisms are equally effective. For example, Gangadharan et al. (2017) find that
communication increases cooperation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, but the
positive effect of communication is stronger in homogeneous groups. Finally, not all studies
find that heterogeneity is detrimental to efficiency, and not under all circumstances. Fisher et
al. (1995) find that heterogeneity in MPCRs does not affect efficiency and Chan et al. (1999)
find that heterogeneity in endowments and/or returns from the public good increase
cooperation in a nonlinear environment. Our study tests the effects of a different kind of
heterogeneity – that is, in network position – on overall efficiency.
Our results show that heterogeneity due to centrality does not affect efficiency. In our
setting, periphery (that is, non-central) players understand the positive value of being connected
via central players and appear to be willing to pay a price for these connections. Central players
seem to restrict their free riding to a level that periphery players find acceptable and thereby
avoid being excluded.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
experimental design and section 3 presents our testable hypotheses. We describe our results in
section 4 and section 5 concludes.

2

Experimental design and procedures

In the experiment, players are matched in fixed groups of five that interact with each other for
one block of five rounds. Each session consists of five such blocks, with random re-matching
between blocks to minimize the possibility of long-term reputation formation. The stage game
in the baseline is a symmetric linear VCM where players allocate an endowment between a
private and a common fund. We vary treatments across two dimensions to implement exclusion
and centrality. The first dimension is whether groups can remove members by majority voting
(Exclusion) or not (No Exclusion). The second dimension concerns the network structure –
either every player is linked to each other (No Centrality) or one player connects two separate
groups (Centrality). The resulting treatments are summarized in Table 1, which also shows the
treatment labels for, and number of independent observations (matching groups; see below) in
each treatment. Centrality can only exist if exclusion is possible; if a central player cannot be
removed from the network, she will always connect the others. The treatment combination noexclusion/centrality therefore does not exist.3

3

We also conducted an additional set of treatments where the central player decides on the allocation of the
surplus created in the VCM games. For more details, see van Leeuwen et al (2015).
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TREATMENTS

Treatment acronym
Participants

No Exclusion
No Centrality
nEnC
N = 85 (n = 6)

Exclusion
No Centrality
EnC
N = 75 (n = 6)

Centrality
EC
N = 90 (n = 6)

Notes. New groups in each block are formed from a 10- or 15-person matching group. N is the number of
subjects and n is the number of independent matching groups. By design the combination of Centrality with
No Exclusion cannot exist.

In all treatments, players are labeled ‘Center’ (C), ‘North’ (N), ‘East’ (E), ‘South’ (S)
and ‘West’ (W). Only C can be central. We will refer to the other four as ‘periphery players’.
Each player interacts with all others to whom she is directly or indirectly connected, i.e., players
in the same network component. Figure 1 presents some possible connections among players
– a complete network (1a), a network with centrality (1d) and subsequent examples of the
consequences for the network of excluding a player.
In each round, players participate in a VCM (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988). Each player
𝑖 receives an endowment of 50 points and all players, simultaneously decide how much, 𝑥𝑖 ∈
[0,50], to invest in a common fund. The payoffs for player 𝑖 are given by:
𝛱𝑖 = 50 − 𝑥𝑖 + (0.6)(𝑥𝑖 + ∑𝑗≠𝑖∈𝑁𝑖 𝑥𝑗 ),
where 𝑁𝑖 denotes the set of players in i’s component and 0.6 is the Marginal Per Capita Return
(MPCR). In all treatments, players are informed at the end of each round of the individual
contributions of each other player in their group of five.
Exclusion
Our first dimension concerns the possibility for players to exclude others from further
interaction with the group. In the treatment with no exclusion (nEnC), all five players
participate in every round. In the other two treatments (EnC and EC), each of the first four
rounds in a block ends with a voting stage that can lead to one or more players being excluded
from the group. After having observed others’ decisions in the current round, each nonexcluded player may cast votes, anonymously and at no cost, to exclude any remaining players
in her component.4 She may cast at most one vote for each player. If a player has received votes
for exclusion from at least half of the players in her component, she is excluded until the end
of the block. Hence, in a group of five, a player is excluded if she receives three or more votes,
4

We allow players the option to vote to exclude themselves as well. This was observed in only 6 out of 3,203
instances of voting.
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and in a group of four, two votes suffice. More than one player can be excluded in a round. At
the end of the round, excluded players are announced as well as the number of votes cast by
each subject.
FIGURE 1: NETWORK STRUCTURES

a: No player excluded

b: Periphery player excluded

c: Center player excluded

d: No player excluded

e: Periphery player excluded

f: Center player excluded

Notes. The top and bottom panel shows the network structure for the cases when there is no centrality and
when there is centrality, respectively. The three cases per panel distinguish between the network comprising
of all players, the network without player N and the network(s) without player C.

If a player is excluded, all her links with other group members are removed. She can
no longer contribute to, or receive any benefits from, the common fund or vote to exclude
others. Excluded players only receive a fixed sum –equal to the endowment– in each of the
remaining rounds. The consequences for the remaining players depend both on the player
concerned and the network structure.
Of course, in many organizations outside the laboratory exclusion of a member does
not require a formal vote. Allowing every member in the group to cast a vote, however, gives
us an individual measure of how they view the choices made by others. In this way, we elicit
the preferences and norms that likely underlie many of the formal exclusion processes outside
the laboratory.
Network structure – Centrality
6

The network structure determines with whom a player interacts. We have two initial network
structures. The first is a complete network as in Figure 1a where every player is connected to
every other player and, therefore, no player’s presence is essential to keep the group together.
If a player is excluded, remaining players are still connected in a group of four, irrespective of
whether a periphery player (1b) or player C (1c) has been excluded.5 In the treatment without
centrality (EnC), the remaining players play a four-person VCM.
The second is an incomplete network where two pairs of periphery players (N&W and
S&E) are connected only via C, as in Figure 1d. Centrality occurs because C is necessary to
keep the two pairs connected to each other. Now, the consequences of removing a player
depend crucially on her position. If a periphery player is excluded (Figure 1e), the remaining
four players remain connected. If the player with centrality is excluded (Figure 1f), her absence
creates two separate groups (N&W and S&E). In this case, the periphery players not only lose
her future contributions (this also occurs when a periphery player is excluded), but also those
of the two other periphery players. Thus, excluding the player with centrality is more costly
than excluding a periphery player. The remaining players play a four-player VCM after
exclusion of a periphery player and two-player VCMs if C has been excluded.
Procedures
The computerized experiment was run in the CREED laboratory of the University of
Amsterdam. In total 250 subjects drawn from the general student population participated in at
most one session each. For each treatment, data were collected in 3 sessions, each with 20, 25
or 30 subjects. Subjects received on-screen instructions and then had to correctly answer a quiz
in order to proceed.6 Each session lasted approximately one hour.
Roles (C or periphery) were randomly assigned at the beginning of a session. To avoid
behavioral spillover effects, these roles remained fixed throughout. In all treatments, subjects’
contributions in a round were identified by their position in the network, i.e., North, South, etc.
To maximize the number of independent observations, re-matching between blocks takes
places with two matching groups of either 10 or 15 subjects, depending on the number of
participants in the session. After the experiment, subjects were requested to fill out a short
demographic questionnaire.

5

We discuss here the situation after the first exclusion. This is presented in Figure 1. The cases for subsequent
exclusions follow straightforwardly.
6
Summaries of the experimental instructions are provided in Appendix A. Full instructions and the test questions
are provided in Appendix D.
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At the end of each session, one block was randomly selected and subjects were paid
their earnings from all rounds within this block. Earnings in points were converted to cash
using an exchange rate of 60 points to one euro. Subjects earned between 11.40 and 19.50 euro,
with an average of 16.30 euro, including a show-up fee of 7 euro.

3

Hypotheses

The stage-game equilibria of these games are straightforward for the case of self-interested
preferences. Players will not contribute to the common fund across treatments. In the
experiment, we implement a (finitely) repeated game and we add exclusion in some treatments.
There are no repeated game equilibria with positive contributions.7 We will use this as the
benchmark prediction yielding the null hypotheses for our statistical tests.
If we assume that (some) players have social preferences or if (some) players believe
that some fraction of the population is willing to exclude free-riders, cooperative repeated game
equilibria may exist in all treatments. This, however, leads to a plethora of equilibria,
depending on the specific assumptions. Instead of deriving all equilibria and searching for
refinements, we derive comparative statics for our treatments using a simple setting with selfinterested and cooperative types a la Kreps et al. (1982). The results of this exercise will serve
as alternative hypotheses. Details about the two-type model can be found in Appendix B. We
proceed with presenting the hypotheses that we will test using our experimental data. These
hypotheses are supported by the two-type model of Appendix B.
First, we consider the effects of the possibility of exclusion on contribution levels in
the absence of centrality. Previous evidence shows that the ability to exclude players from the
group raises contributions (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). The intuition here is that, without
exclusion (nEnC), free riders have no incentive to contribute. This yields the following
hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 (effect of exclusion in the absence of centrality):
The threat of exclusion increases contributions: Contribution levels in nEnC <
Contribution levels in EnC.

7

In some settings, costless voting could lead to repeated game equilibria with positive contributions (Hirshleifer
and Rasmusen 1989). However, in our study, excluded players still earn their endowment (which equals the Nash
stage-game payoff). For this reason, there exists no subgame perfect equilibrium with positive contributions if all
agents are self-interested.

8

Next, recall that exclusion is a necessary condition for player C to become a player with
centrality. Thus, for the effects of centrality, we compare situations where groups can exclude
members in networks without (EnC) or with (EC) a central player. Excluding a free rider
without centrality (any player in EnC or a periphery player in EC) will not affect expected
payoffs. Hence, centrality does not change the effects of a threat of exclusion on periphery
players. Excluding a free rider with centrality does come at a cost, however; players can no
longer benefit from the contributions by cooperative types connected via the player with
centrality. This reduces the chances that a free rider with centrality will be excluded, allowing
her to ‘abuse’ her position. This is summarized in Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2 (effects of centrality):
(a) Players with centrality contribute less than periphery players: Contribution levels
by C-players in EC < Contribution levels by periphery players in EC.
(b) C-players contribute less when they are central: Contribution levels by C-players
in EC < Contribution levels by C-players in EnC.
Finally, we consider how the votes to exclude are affected by the treatments. For exclusion to
work as a disciplining mechanism (Hypothesis 1), players should vote to exclude those with
low contribution levels. However, players with centrality will be excluded less often.

Hypothesis 3 (voting to exclude):
(a) Players with higher contributions are less likely to receive votes for exclusion.
(b) Conditional on contributions, players with centrality are less likely to receive votes
for exclusion than periphery players.

9

FIGURE 2: MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS BY PLAYER POSITION

Notes. For each round, the contribution level is averaged across five blocks. The graphs are based on decisions
by individuals who have not been excluded from their group and who are not isolated.

4

Results

We start with a general overview of our results. Figure 2 presents mean contribution levels per
round across treatments. For this overview we combine data from all blocks. Table 2 shows
the mean contribution levels across all rounds and in the first round. Overall, the figure and
table suggest that contributions are higher with exclusion than without, and that differences in
cooperation between subject C and the periphery occur only when C has centrality. In what
follows, we analyze these differences in more detail. Unless stated otherwise, all reported
statistics come from two-sided permutation t tests using matching groups as the independent
unit of analysis, and averaging over all rounds and blocks. The number of (independent)
observations is thus six in each comparison sample (cf. Table 1). Permutation t tests allow for
testing for differences in means in small samples while the more conventional Mann-Whitney
and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests test for differences in distributions (see, for example Moir 1998
and the discussion in Appendix 3 of Schram et al. 2018). Nevertheless, our results and
conclusions are robust to using Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests instead (see
Table C.1 in Appendix C).

10

TABLE 2: MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS

No Centrality
nEnC

No Centrality
EnC

Centrality
EC

Effect of
exclusion
(p-values)
nEnC vs EnC

26.0 (3.8)
26.7 (5.6)
25.9 (3.8)

35.0 (5.7)
34.6 (6.8)
35.0 (5.5)

37.8 (2.8)
34.7 (4.5)
38.6 (2.7)

0.010
0.059
0.009

0.299
0.968
0.183

0.678

0.473

0.003

32.9 (5.1)
34.9 (8.0)
32.4 (5.7)

39.3 (4.7)
40.2 (6.6)
39.1 (4.9)

42.9 (2.7)
39.0 (4.0)
43.9 (2.8)

0.046
0.248
0.053

0.127
0.698
0.068

0.427

0.652

0.001

No Exclusion

All rounds
All subjects
C-subjects
Periphery
C vs periphery
(p-value)
First round
All subjects
C-subjects
Periphery
C vs periphery
(p-value)

Exclusion

Effect of
centrality
(p-values)
EnC vs EC

Notes. Cells give mean contributions across blocks and rounds in points, with standard deviations in
parentheses. Top panel: entries based on all rounds and blocks, and players that were not excluded or isolated.
Bottom panel: Entries based on the first round of each block, before any exclusion could occur. P-values come
from permutation t tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.

4.1

Exclusion in the absence of centrality

Figure 2 shows the usual pattern of declining contribution levels over time in the standard
public goods game (nEnC) without centrality and exclusion (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In
the absence of exclusion and centrality, the only difference between subjects is one of framing,
where subject C is presented as being in the ‘middle’ of the group. A one-sample permutation
t test (henceforth, 1PtT) shows no significant difference in contributions between subjects C
and periphery subjects in nEnC (1PtT, p = 0.678, n = 6). Thus, we find no evidence of framing
due to the network representation.
Once we allow for exclusion (EnC), again no significant differences between subjects
C and periphery subjects arise (1PtT, p = 0.473, n = 6). For both, we do observe that
contribution levels increase with respect to nEnC. Two-sample permutation t tests (henceforth,
2PtT) show that the increase is significant for periphery subjects (2PtT, p = 0.009, n = 12) and
marginally significant for subject C (2PtT, p = 0.059, n = 12). As a consequence, average
contribution levels in the group as a whole are higher (2PtT, p = 0.010, n = 12) when exclusion
is possible. This replicates findings in Cinyabuguma et al. (2005).

11

Conceivably, these findings could be attributed to selection effects because after round
1, some subjects might be excluded. To investigate this, we considered only first-round choices
in every block (see the bottom panel of Table 2). The results are qualitatively similar, though
the effect of exclusion for periphery players is no longer significant at the 5%-level (p = 0.053).

Result 1 (effects of exclusion): In the absence of centrality, the opportunity to exclude group
members raises contribution levels of both subject C and periphery subjects.

This result provides direct support for Hypothesis 1.

4.2

The effects of centrality

Figure 2 shows that in the presence of centrality (EC) there is a difference between contribution
levels of the subjects with centrality and periphery subjects. Subjects with centrality seem to
‘abuse’ their position; their contributions are 10 percent lower than those of periphery subjects,
and this difference is statistically significant (1PtT, p = 0.003, n = 6). Figure 2 and Table 2
suggest that the introduction of centrality (EnC vs EC) does not affect subjects C’s mean
contributions across rounds but increases those of periphery subjects. Tests show that the effect
of centrality on contributions is not significant for both (2PtT, p = 0.968, n = 12 for C-players;
p = 0.183, n = 12 for the periphery). Once again, the results are qualitatively the same when
considering only round 1 (cf. bottom panel Table 2).

Result 2 (effects of centrality):
(a) Contribution levels of subjects with centrality are lower than those of periphery
subjects.
(b) Contribution levels of neither subjects with centrality nor periphery subjects are
significantly affected by introducing centrality.

This result provides support for hypothesis 2(a), but not for 2(b).

12

FIGURE 3: CONTRIBUTIONS

Notes: Histograms of individual contributions in rounds 1-4. The graphs are based on decisions by
individuals who have not been excluded from their group and who are not isolated.

In treatment EC, we observe lower contributions by subjects with centrality than by those in
the periphery. To avoid the end effect, we consider only the first four rounds. Then, the average
difference is 4.6 points per round (43.8 points for periphery subjects versus 39.2 points for Csubjects). This difference could be driven by a few C-subjects who completely free ride, or by
many C-subjects who partially free ride. To investigate this, we plot the distributions of
individual contributions in the first four rounds by treatment and position in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that the difference in contributions between C- and periphery subjects
is mostly driven by a large number of C-subjects who contribute somewhat less than the
periphery. In treatment EC, 35% of the C observations are between 40 and 44 points as
compared to 17% of the periphery observations. At the same time, in EC, Csubjects contribute between 45 and 50 points in 41% of the observations, while this is the case
for 66% of the periphery observations. Other contribution levels are rarely observed in EC. All
in all, though very low contributions (5 points or less) are more frequent among C-subjects
(6%) than among periphery subjects (2%), the aggregate result of lower contributions by Cplayers in EC is mostly driven by those who partially free ride. Note, however, that the
13

contributions gap resulting from centrality is a diff-in-diff result caused by the combined effects
for periphery and C-subjects. The effects of centrality are not significant for periphery and Csubjects separately (see Table 2).
FIGURE 4: EXCLUSION BY PLAYER POSITION

Notes: Cumulative exclusion rates for periphery and center subjects. Exclusion rates reflect the mean
proportion of subjects excluded up to the previous round. Means are taken across all blocks.

4.3

Voting and exclusion

Figure 4 presents the cumulative proportion of C subjects and periphery subjects excluded over
rounds in the exclusion treatments. In both treatments with exclusion, few subjects are
excluded. In the absence of centrality (EnC), cumulative exclusion rates remain well under
20% to the end. Further, there is no discernible difference in the rate of exclusion between
subject C and periphery subjects. With centrality (EC), exclusion rates remain under 20% as
well and, again, subjects with centrality are not more likely to be excluded than periphery
subjects. This is remarkable, because the cooperation levels of the former are lower than those
of the latter (cf. Figure 2).
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TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A VOTE FOR EXCLUSION
No Centrality
(EnC)

Centrality
(EC)

-0.060***
(0.003)

-0.063***
(0.003)

C-subject

0.005
(0.169)

-0.729***
(0.165)

C-subject × Contribution

-0.000
(0.005)

0.018***
(0.004)

# subjects in subgroup

0.316***
(0.060)

0.457***
(0.075)

Round

-0.049*
(0.028)

0.096***
(0.027)

Block

0.042*
(0.022)

0.018
(0.021)

Constant

-1.042**
(0.345)

-1.900***
(0.395)

Observations

5,768

6,978

Pseudo R2

0.273

0.298

Wald-chi2(6) (p-value)

626.33
(0.000)

724.06
(0.000)

Chi2(1) test [Contribution + C-subject ×
Contribution] = 0 (p-value)

173.76
(0.000)

137.28
(0.000)

Contribution

Notes: We allow for random effects at the matching group and subject level. Standard errors in parentheses. *,
**
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

To further study the exclusion decisions Table 3 presents, for both treatments with
exclusion, estimates of (multilevel) random effect Probit regressions of the probability of
receiving a vote for exclusion. The regression estimates the probability that subject j votes to
exclude subject i as a function of i’s contribution, whether i is located in the C-position, the
interaction between the latter two, the number of subjects in i and j’s subgroup, and the current
round and block. We only include observations where i and j could vote for each other, i.e.,
neither should be excluded and they should be connected. We allow for random effects at the
subject level (of subject j) and the matching group level. To visualize the results, we plot the
estimated probability that a subject i will receive a vote as a function of contribution levels in
Figure 5.
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FIGURE 5. PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A VOTE FOR EXCLUSION

Notes: Probability of receiving a vote for exclusion as function of contributions for C-subjects and periphery
subjects. Estimations based on the regressions reported in Table 3. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals.

In both treatments, there is a strong negative effect of contributions on the probability
of receiving an exclusion vote (see the contribution variable in Table 3 and the negative slope
in Figure 5). In addition, the first regression shows that in the absence of centrality (EnC), there
is no discrimination between roles. The second regression shows that subjects with centrality
are less likely to receive a vote for exclusion, even after controlling for contribution levels.
Moreover, the interaction term is positive and significant. Figure 5 illustrates the net effect; for
low cooperation levels, subjects with centrality are less likely to receive a vote for exclusion
than periphery subjects. The difference deceases with increasing contribution levels, with the
probability of an exclusion vote approaching zero. Based on these estimations, a fully freeriding periphery subject will receive a vote with 73% chance, whereas a fully free-riding Csubject with centrality will receive a vote with only 46% chance. If no one has yet been
excluded, the probability of a fully free-riding player being excluded is then 70% for periphery
players and 26% for player C.

Result 3:
(a) In both exclusion treatments, there is a negative relation between contribution levels
and the probability of receiving exclusion votes.
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(b) Controlling for contribution levels, subjects with centrality are less likely to receive
exclusion votes than periphery subjects.

Together, this provides direct support for Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b).

4.4

Earnings and efficiency

Our results show that the possibility of exclusion raises contributions and that subjects with
centrality contribute less than subjects in the periphery. Our analysis was based on subjects that
were not excluded or isolated. As excluded players no longer benefit from contributions of
others and can no longer contribute themselves, the net effect of exclusion and centrality on
earnings is ambiguous. In this subsection we consider these effects.
TABLE 4: EARNINGS
No Exclusion

All subjects
C-subjects
Periphery
C vs periphery
(p-value)

Exclusion

No Centrality
nEnC
102.1 (7.5)
101.5 (8.2)
102.3 (7.6)

No Centrality
EnC
113.6 (14.0)
114.0 (14.4)
113.5 (14.1)

Centrality
EC
120.5 (5.2)
124.0 (5.6)
119.6 (5.4)

0.678

0.736

0.001

Effect of
exclusion
(p-values)
nEnC vs EnC
0.112
0.101
0.111

Effect of
centrality
(p-values)
EnC vs EC
0.308
0.140
0.361

Notes. Cells give mean earnings per round in points, with standard deviations in parentheses. Entries based on
all rounds and blocks, and all subjects, regardless of being excluded or isolated. P-values come from
permutation t tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.

Table 4 presents summary statistics for earnings in each treatment, both at the group
level and for C-subjects and periphery subjects separately.8 All numbers include earnings by
excluded players. Without centrality, group earnings are higher when exclusion is available,
but the difference is not statistically significant (nEnC vs EnC: 2PtT, p = 0.112, n = 12). This
is in spite of the fact that surplus may be lost if subjects are actually excluded. The increase in
contribution levels thus roughly cancels out the cost of excluding subjects.
Interestingly, centrality does not lower total earnings. The addition of centrality
somewhat increases total earnings, though not significantly so (EnC vs EC: 2PtT, p = 0.308, n
= 12). The same holds if we compare earnings of C-subjects or periphery subjects; for both,
earnings are not significantly different in EC than in EnC (2PtT, p = 0.140, n = 12 for C8

In Table C.2 in Appendix C, we also report p-values based on Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.
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subjects and p = 0.361, n = 12 for periphery subjects). With centrality, C-subjects do earn
significantly more than periphery subjects (EC: 1PtT, p = 0.001, n = 6), which is not the case
in the two treatments without centrality (nEnC: 1PtT , p = 0.678, n = 6; EnC: 1PtT , p = 0. 736,
n = 6).
All in all, we conclude that centrality has no negative effect on efficiency. Centrality,
however, comes at the cost of increased inequality between the central player and those in the
periphery.

5

Concluding remarks

We study how network structure and positions –in particular, the presence of centrality– affect
cooperative behavior in a VCM setting. Centrality is a valuable position to hold because
exclusion of a central player is costly to other players, who stand to lose access to substantial
parts of the network. Our experiment is the first to provide a controlled test of the effects of
centrality. We find clear evidence that central players ‘abuse’ their position by contributing
less than the periphery, but that this only increases inequality, without a negative effect on
group efficiency.
Our results are important because –as argued in the introduction– central positions can
appear in many networks, especially in informal organizations. Similarly, exclusion of
members is a possibility in many organizations. The previous literature (e.g., Cinyabuguma et
al. 2005) has seen exclusion as a mechanism by which cooperation norms can be enforced. Our
results show that such norms are not set in stone. Periphery players are affected differently by
exclusion than those who are central. This asymmetric enforcement of norms has, to the best
of our knowledge, not been observed before.
Interestingly, central players only free ride slightly more than those without this
position. Although the contributions (earnings) of central players are significantly lower
(higher) than the contributions (earnings) of periphery players, the differences are relatively
small. We find that the earnings of central players are on average only 3.7% higher than the
earnings of periphery players. Whether this reflects an accurate estimate of the extent of free
riding that is deemed acceptable by periphery players is at this stage an open question. Central
players might have correct expectations about the norm that the periphery is willing to enforce
(that is, further reduction in contributions would lead to exclusion) or might be too cautious,
leaving opportunities for further free riding on the table. Our experiment was not designed to
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investigate the extent to which central players are best responding to the periphery’s exclusion
strategies, but this is certainly an interesting avenue for future research.
Other interesting extensions would further increase the generalizability of our findings.
For example, subjects in our design are randomly allocated to central or periphery positions,
which could reduce the legitimacy of free riding by a central player. Central positions outside
the laboratory are seldom randomly obtained. If such a position is somehow ‘earned’, then both
the player concerned and the periphery might find free riding (even) more acceptable. One
could add entitlement to positions to our design to investigate this. Alternatively, individuals
in a central position might have higher self-image concerns (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) than
those in the periphery, for example because they feel a sense of responsibility for keeping the
network together. If so, this might decrease their tendency to free ride. One could add measures
of self-image and responsibility to our design to investigate this possibility.
The take away from our study is that even with random assignment and anonymous
positions in the network, players with a central position partially free ride, and that this is
tolerated by players in the periphery.
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ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL (ONLINE ONLY)
Appendix A: Summary of the experimental instructions
Below are the summaries of the instructions as it was handed out to the participants in the
experiment. Full instructions for all treatments are available in Appendix D. Each paragraph
that was included only in some treatments starts with <treatment acronym>.
Summary of instructions
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. You will be paid € 7 for your participation
plus whatever you earn in the experiment.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions at any
time, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately. You will record your
decisions privately and anonymously at your computer terminal. Other participants will never
be able to link you with your personal decisions or earnings from the experiment.
During the experiment, all earnings are denoted in points. At the end of the experiment, your
earnings will be converted to euros at the rate: 60 points = € 1.
The experiment consists of 5 blocks. Each block consists of 5 rounds. At the end of the
experiment, one block will be randomly selected and everyone will be paid for their decisions
in that block.
The composition of the groups will remain the same for the 5 rounds in a block. At the end of
a block, participants will randomly be divided into new groups of five.
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will randomly be assigned a position North (N), East (E), South (S), West (W) or Center (C). These positions will remain fixed
throughout the experiment. For example, if you are assigned the North position, you will be
in the north position in each round in each block of the experiment.
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 points. You
decide on how much of this endowment to invest in each of two accounts. These are called a
"private account" and a "group account". You may invest everything in the private account,
everything in the group account, or any combination of the two, as long as you invest 50 points
in total.
Your earnings include earnings both from your private account and the group account:
 Earnings from your private account: You will earn 1 point for each point invested
in your private account.
 Earnings from the group account: Your earnings from the group account are based
on the total number of points invested in the group account by all members in your
group. Each group member will earn 0.6 points for each point in the group account
regardless of who made the investment.
<EnC, EC> Exclusion of a member means that this player can no longer invest in the group
account and will not receive any earnings from the group account in the remaining
22

rounds. The excluded participant will receive an endowment of 50 points in each of the
remaining rounds in the block. All 50 points will automatically be invested in the private
account.
<EnC, EC> To decide on who will be excluded, the group members will select candidates for
exclusion.
<EnC, EC> You can indicate for each member of your (sub-)group whether or not you
think that s/he should be excluded from the group in future rounds in the current block. You
can vote for as many or as few participants as you want.
<EnC, EC> If some member(s) of the group have previously been excluded, you can only vote
on excluding members of the sub-group you are in. Participants who previously have been
excluded cannot vote for the exclusion of others.
<EnC, EC> If half or more members of the (sub-)group vote to exclude a participant, that
participant will be excluded in future rounds in the current block.
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Appendix B: Two-type model
We study a simple model with cooperative types (similar to Kreps et al. 1982) to derive
comparative statics for the effects of exclusion and centrality. We assume that there are two
types of players: strategic self-interested types and cooperative types. Self-interested types
maximize their own payoffs. Cooperative types unconditionally cooperate (contribute the
entire endowment) and also vote to exclude anyone who does not (if exclusion is possible).
This type of behavior is consistent with ‘homo moralis’ preferences described by Alger and
Weibull (2013). See Miettinen et al. (2017) for evidence that behavior in a sequential prisoners’
dilemma is largely consistent with such preferences.
Players with homo moralis preferences maximize a convex combination of self-interest and
moral preferences. Moral preferences entail maximizing payoffs conditional on everyone else
acting the same, i.e. a player with these preferences maximizes the following utility function:
𝑢(𝑥, 𝐲) = (1 − 𝜅) ⋅ 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐲) + 𝜅𝜋(𝑥, 𝐱),
where 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐲) denotes the monetary payoff of playing strategy 𝑥 when all others play strategies
𝐲. The parameter 𝜅 ∈ [0,1] is the degree of morality and 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐱) the monetary payoff of
playing strategy 𝑥 if all others would use the same strategy 𝑥. In our games, the assumed
strategy of cooperative types maximizes these payoffs for any player with high enough
morality. For 𝜅 = 1, it follows directly from 𝑢(𝑥, 𝐲) = 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐱) = 50 − 𝑥 + 0.6 ∗ 5 ∗ 𝑥 that
without exclusion, utility is maximized in any round by choosing 𝑥 = 50. Across T rounds,
utility is then 150T. For 𝜅 < 1 full contribution is still utility maximizing as long as not too
many others act selfishly (so that the earnings lost to the selfish others is outweighed by the
morality term). When 𝜅 = 1 , the complete strategy of full contribution in T rounds and
exclusion of free riders again yields utility equal to 𝜋(50, 𝟓𝟎) = 150𝑇. We conclude that these
moral types’ preferences are consistent with the behavior assumed for the cooperative types in
our model.
The proportion of cooperative types is given by p, which we assume to be a minority, i.e. 𝑝 ∈
[0,0.4). The upper bound on p assumes that a plausible fraction of at most 40% of the players
are unconditional co-operators. In similar environments, Fischbacher et al. (2001) have shown
that even the number of conditional co-operators remains below half of the subjects. There are
even fewer unconditional cooperators.
We are interested in the range of 𝑝 where self-interested types will act cooperatively on the
equilibrium path. More precisely, we study the range of 𝑝 under which a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium can be constructed where self-interested types fully contribute until (and including)
the penultimate round. Clearly, there are many other equilibria possible, involving various
levels of contribution. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on full cooperation up until (and
including) the penultimate period. To start, note that in all treatments, in the final round, selfinterested players will simply play according to the stage-game Nash equilibrium and
contribute nothing.
No Exclusion and No Centrality (nEnC)
Without exclusion, self-interested players will not cooperate in the penultimate round, as there
is no mechanism through which cooperative behavior can be enforced. This is independent of
the proportion of cooperative types 𝑝. So, for no value of 𝑝 will self-interested types act
cooperatively in the penultimate round, or –by backward induction– in any preceding round.
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Exclusion and No Centrality (EnC)
In this case, the following strategy (followed by the self-interested types) is part of a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium:
-

All self-interested players fully contribute in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇, and contribute nothing
in round 𝑇.
All players vote to exclude any player who did not fully contribute in previous rounds
and do not vote to exclude any player who always fully contributed.

Note that in this case, self-interested players are indifferent about voting to exclude players that
do not act cooperatively, as excluding a free rider is costless. Moreover, self-interested players
will not vote to exclude players that act cooperatively as doing so is costly in expectation if
𝑝 > 0. Cooperative types vote to exclude free riders by assumption. Hence, a strategy profile
where free riders are excluded and cooperators are not, may be part of an equilibrium. This
means that in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇, a self-interested player will act cooperatively if the payoff from
acting cooperatively until and including the penultimate round plus free riding in the final
round (and assuming other self-interested players will do the same) exceeds the payoff from
deviating in the current round and being subsequently excluded. Assume this deviation takes
place in round t. then the condition reads:
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50𝑝)) ≥ 50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50,
holds. Rewriting this condition yields:
5
𝑝 ≥ 1 − 6 (𝑇 − 𝑡).
Note that if this condition holds for 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 1, it will also hold for all preceding rounds. For
1
1
𝑡 = 𝑇 − 1, this gives 𝑝 ≥ 6. Hence, for any 𝑝 ≥ 6 full cooperation up until the penultimate
round can be supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. As previous work by
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) found that the threat of exclusion increases contributions, we will
1
assume that 𝑝 ≥ 6 from now on.
Exclusion and Centrality (EC)
In this case, we consider the following two strategy profiles (for self-interested types) as
candidates for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
Candidate 1 (full contributions by both periphery and C-players)
- All players fully contribute in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇 and contribute nothing in round T.
- All players vote to exclude any player who did not fully contribute in previous rounds
and do not vote to exclude any player who always fully contributed.
Candidate 2 (full contributions by periphery players only)
- All periphery players fully contribute in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇 and contribute nothing in
round T.
- All periphery players vote to exclude any periphery player who did not fully contribute
in previous rounds and do not vote to exclude a periphery player who always fully
contributed. Periphery players never vote to exclude the C-player.
- The C-player contributes nothing in any round 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇.
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-

The C-player votes to exclude any periphery player who did not fully contribute in
previous rounds and does not vote to exclude a periphery player who always fully
contributed. The C-player never votes to exclude herself.

Excluding an uncooperative periphery player will not affect expected payoffs in future rounds.
Excluding an uncooperative player with centrality, however, comes at a cost; one can no longer
benefit from the contributions by cooperative types who were connected only via C. Hence,
self-interested periphery players will not be willing to exclude an uncooperative player with
centrality for any 𝑝 > 0. This means that free-riding center players will only be excluded if
there are three or more cooperative types among the periphery players (because a majority of
votes is needed), which happens with probability 𝑞 = 𝑝4 + 4𝑝3 (1 − 𝑝). A self-interested
center player will then free ride if there are not too many cooperative types around (in
expectation). Precisely, a self-interested center player will free ride in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇 if:
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50𝑝))
≤ (1 − 𝑞) ((𝑇 − 𝑡)(50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50𝑝)))
+ 𝑞 ((50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50).
Rewriting gives:
𝑞((𝑇 − 𝑡) + 𝑝 − 1) ≤

1
(𝑇 − 𝑡).
6

For our experimental parameter 𝑇 = 5, this holds for any 𝑡 < 𝑇 as long as 𝑝 ≤ 0.4. Hence, if
𝑝 ≤ 0.4, Candidate 1 cannot be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Next consider Candidate 2. After the first round, periphery players will learn whether the center
player is a cooperative type or not. First, consider the case where the center turns out to be selfinterested, and has not been excluded. Note that if the center acts uncooperatively, all selfinterested players will be revealed to be self-interested, as after each round the number of votes
cast for exclusion by each player is revealed to all. Hence, after round 𝑡 = 1, it is common
knowledge who is a self-interested type or not. There are three sub-cases: with two, three, or
four self-interested periphery players (if there were only one self-interested periphery player,
an uncooperative center would be excluded). With 𝑦 cooperative types, and 4 − 𝑦 selfinterested players in the periphery, a self-interested periphery player will fully contribute if:
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6 ⋅ 50𝑦) ≥ 50 + 0.6(3 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50,
(𝑇 − 𝑡)70 ≥ 90 − 30𝑦,
which holds for any round 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇, as long as 𝑦 ≥ 1, i.e. as long as there is at least one
cooperative type in the periphery.
Second, consider the case that the center turned out to be self-interested and has been
excluded. This immediately implies that there is at most one self-interested type in the
periphery. Then, in any round 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇, this self-interested periphery player will fully
contribute if:
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(2 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6 ⋅ 50) ≥ 50 + 0.6 ⋅ 50 + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50,
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(𝑇 − 𝑡)(10) ≥ 0.
which holds for any 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇.
Next, consider the case where the center turns out to be a cooperative type. In this case, a
self-interested periphery player will contribute in any round 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇 if:
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(50 + 3 ⋅ 50𝑝)) ≥ 50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50,
holds. Rewriting this condition yields:
𝑝≥1−

10
(𝑇 − 𝑡),
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which clearly holds for any 𝑝 ≥ 0.
It only remains to consider the first round, where it is still unclear whether the center player is
a cooperative type or not. In this round, a self-interested periphery player will fully contribute
if:
𝑝 ((𝑇 − 1)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(50 + 3 ⋅ 50𝑝)))
+ (1 − 𝑝) ((1 − 𝑝)3 (0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 1)50)
+ (1 − (1 − 𝑝)3 ) ((𝑇 − 1)(0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(3 ⋅ 50𝑝))))
≥ 𝑝(50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 1)50)
+ (1 − 𝑝)(50 + 0.6(3 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 1)50),
𝑝((𝑇 − 1)150 + (80 + 90𝑝))
+ (1 − 𝑝)((𝑇 − 1)120 + (50 + 90𝑝)
+ (1 − 𝑝)3 (70 − 90𝑝 + (𝑇 − 1)(−70)) ≥ 140 + (𝑇 − 1)50 + 30𝑝,
holds. Solving yields that for 𝑇 = 5 this holds for any 𝑝 ≥ 0.022.
In sum, for 1/6 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.4 no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in treatment EC where
all players (including C) fully contribute in the first 𝑇 − 1 rounds. However, a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium where all periphery players fully contribute in the first 𝑇 − 1 rounds, and
where the center free-rides can be supported for 0.022 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.4. Note that for the case where
all 5 players turn out be self-interested, no such equilibrium exists, which happens with a
probability of (1 − 𝑝)5 .9
Our hypotheses for the experiment are supported by the model. For 1/6 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.4, full
cooperation cannot be part of an SPNE for all players in nEnC and C-players in EC. It can be
supported for periphery and C-players in EnC, and for periphery players in EC.

For simplicity, we omitted the condition that strategy profile `Candidate 2’ should include that self-interested
periphery players should only contribute if not all others have been revealed to be self-interested.
9
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Appendix C: Tests based on Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed-ranks
tests
TABLE C.1: MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS, MANN-WHITNEY TESTS & WILCOXON SIGNED-RANKS TESTS

All rounds
All subjects
C-subjects
Periphery
C vs periphery
(p-value)
First round
All subjects
C-subjects
Periphery
C vs periphery
(p-value)

Centrality
EC

Effect of
exclusion
(p-values)
nEnC vs EnC

Effect of
centrality
(p-values)
EnC vs EC

35.0 (5.7)
34.6 (6.8)
35.0 (5.5)

37.8 (2.8)
34.7 (4.5)
38.6 (2.7)

0.010
0.078
0.016

0.262
0.873
0.262

0.463

0.463

0.028

32.9 (5.1)
34.9 (8.0)
32.4 (5.7)

39.3 (4.7)
40.2 (6.6)
39.1 (4.9)

42.9 (2.7)
39.0 (4.0)
43.9 (2.8)

0.078
0.262
0.055

0.078
0.936
0.055

0.463

0.600

0.028

No Exclusion

Exclusion

No Centrality
nEnC

No Centrality
EnC

26.0 (3.8)
26.7 (5.6)
25.9 (3.8)

Notes. Cells give mean contributions across blocks and rounds in points, with standard deviations in
parentheses. Top panel: Entries based on all rounds and blocks, and players that were not excluded or isolated.
Bottom panel: Entries based on the first round of each block, hence before any exclusion could occur. P-values
comparing treatments come from (two-sided) Mann-Whitney tests and p-values comparing C vs periphery
players come from (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.

TABLE C.2: EARNINGS, MANN-WHITNEY TESTS & WILCOXON SIGNED-RANKS TESTS

All subjects
C-subjects
Periphery
C vs periphery
(p-value)

No Exclusion

Exclusion

No Centrality
nEnC
102.1 (7.5)
101.5 (8.2)
102.3 (7.6)

No Centrality
EnC
113.6 (14.0)
114.0 (14.4)
113.5 (14.1)

Centrality
EC
120.5 (5.2)
124.0 (5.6)
119.6 (5.4)

0.463

0.917

0.028

Effect of
exclusion
(p-values)
nEnC vs EnC
0.078
0.037
0.109

Effect of
centrality
(p-values)
EnC vs EC
0.150
0.150
0.200

Notes. Cells give mean earnings per round in points, with standard deviations in parentheses. Entries based on
all rounds and blocks, and all subjects, regardless of being excluded or isolated. P-values comparing treatments
come from (two-sided) Mann-Whitney tests and p-values comparing C vs periphery players come from (twosided) Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.

28

Appendix D: Full instructions
Below are the transcripts of the instructions and test questions in the experiment. Each
paragraph that was included only in some treatments starts with <treatment acronym(s)>. In
the second set of test questions, all the numbers were randomly and independently generated
for each participant.
Welcome
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. You will be paid € 7 for your participation
plus whatever you earn in the experiment.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions at any
time, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately. You will record your
decisions privately and anonymously at your computer terminal. Other participants will never
be able to link you with your personal decisions or earnings from the experiment.
These instructions will explain what you may do in this experiment. If you follow them
carefully, you may make a substantial amount of money. How much you make depends on
your decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you
privately at the end of today's session.
During the experiment, all earnings are denoted in points. At the end of the experiment, your
earnings will be converted to euros at the rate: 60 points = € 1.
<nEnC> These instructions are given in 4 pages like this one. While reading them, you will be
able to page back and forth by clicking "next page" or "previous page" at the bottom of your
screen, or by using the menu on top of the screen. The page may be larger than fits on your
screen. In those cases, you can use the scroll bar to move down the page.
<EnC, EC> These instructions are given in 6 pages like this one. While reading them, you will
be able to page back and forth by clicking "next page" or "previous page" at the bottom of your
screen, or by using the menu on top of the screen. The page may be larger than fits on your
screen. In those cases, you can use the scroll bar to move down the page.
Blocks, Rounds and Positions
The experiment consists of 5 blocks. Each block consists of 5 rounds. At the end of the
experiment, one block will be randomly selected and everyone will be paid for their decisions
in that block.
The composition of the groups will remain the same for the 5 rounds in a block. At the end
of a block, participants will randomly be divided into new groups of five.
Each of the five individuals in a group has a 'position'. We call these the North (N), East (E),
South (S), West (W) and Center (C) positions. These are shown in the following figure. We
will explain later how the positions are connected to each other.
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<nEnC, EC>

<EnC>

At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will randomly be assigned a position North (N), East (E), South (S), West (W) or Center (C). These positions will remain fixed
throughout the experiment. For example, if you are assigned the North position, you will be
in the north position in each round in each block of the experiment.
Thus, while there will always be one participant in each position in your group, the participants
occupying other positions will change from one block to the next (and remain the same in the
5 rounds of any single block).
Investment Decision
<nEnC> In each round of every block, you will be asked to make one decision. We will now
describe this decision.
<EnC, EC> In each round of every block, you will be asked to make either one or two
decisions. Here, we describe the first. Whether or not you need to make a second decision, and
what this means, will be explained shortly.
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 points. This
endowment will be the same in each round and for every participant. Your decision is on how
much of this endowment to invest in each of two accounts. These are called a "private
account" and a "group account". You must invest your complete endowment in these two
accounts. This means that every point must be invested in either the private account or the
group account. It is completely up to you how much you want to invest in either of the two.
You may invest everything in the private account, everything in the group account, or any
combination of the two, as long as you invest 50 points in total.
After everyone has made their investment decisions, you will be informed of the investment
decisions of each of the participants in your group and your earnings in this round. These
earnings include earnings both from your private account and the group account.



Earnings from your private account: You will earn 1 point for each point invested
in your private account.
Earnings from the group account: Your earnings from the group account are based on
the total number of points invested in the group account by all members in your group.
Each group member will earn 0.6 points for each point in the group account
regardless of who made the investment.
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Your earnings from earlier rounds cannot be carried over to use in the following rounds.
You will receive a new endowment in each round. The same process will be repeated for a total
of 5 rounds each in each of the 5 blocks.
<EnC, EC> Exclusion of a Group Member
<EnC, EC> The second decision you may be asked to make is whether to exclude other
players from your group for the remainder of the block. We will explain shortly how players
may be excluded. First, we explain what exclusion means.
<EnC, EC> Exclusion of a member means that this player can no longer invest in the group
account and will not receive any earnings from the group account in the remaining
rounds. The excluded participant will receive an endowment of 50 points in each of the
remaining rounds in the block. All 50 points will automatically be invested in the private
account. Thus, the excluded participant will earn 50 points in each of the remaining rounds in
the current block.
<EnC, EC> We can indicate exclusion of a member by deleting the lines connecting this player
to other group members. As an example, the following figure shows the case where player N
has been excluded.
<EnC>

<EC>

<EnC> Note that after exclusion of N, a group of four remains, that can invest in a joint group
account. These four players form a sub-group. All participants in your sub-group are indicated
by a green circle, excluded participants are indicated by a red circle and participants in another
subgroup by an orange circle. The round will continue like before with the exception that the
excluded participant cannot invest any points in the group account.
If you are not N, your group account earnings will be 0.6 x (points invested in the group account
by W, C, E, and S). The same holds if not N, but W, E, S or C is excluded.
<EC> Note that after exclusion of N, a group of four remains, that can invest in a joint group
account. These four players form a sub-group. All participants in your sub-group are indicated
by a green circle, excluded participants are indicated by a red circle and participants in another
subgroup by an orange circle. The round will continue like before with the exception that the
excluded participant cannot invest any points in the group account. If you are not N, your group
account earnings will be 0.6 x (points invested in the group account by W, C, E, and S). The
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same holds if not N, but W, E, or S is excluded. If C is excluded, this is different however. In
this case, the following case is obtained:
<EnC>

<EC>

<EC> This shows that exclusion of C leaves two separate sub-groups within your group:
 participants in the North (N) and West (W) positions
 participants in the South (S) and East (E) positions.
<EC> Earnings from the group account will depend on the total points invested in the group
by participants in your sub-group alone. You will earn 0.6 points for each point invested by
the two participants (including you) in your sub-group. For instance, if you are in the North
position, your earnings from the group account will be 0.6 x (points invested in the group
account by you and the participant in the West position). Similarly, if you are in the South
position, your group account earnings depend on the group account investments of yourself
and the East participant. You will not earn anything from the group account investments
of the participants in the other sub-group. Note again that the Center participant cannot
invest any points in the group account if excluded.
<EnC, EC> The Exclusion Decision
<EnC, EC> To decide on who will be excluded, the group members will select candidates for
exclusion.
<EnC, EC> You can indicate for each member of your (sub-)group whether or not you
think that s/he should be excluded from the group in future rounds in the current block. After
you have been informed about the others' investment decisions in a round, you will be given
the following list.
<EnC, EC>
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<EnC, EC> When deciding, you will have access to all previous investment decisions in the
current block by the players. You can register your vote to exclude a participant by clicking
the button next to that participant's position. If you do not want to exclude a participant,
leave the button unselected. In this example, we have selected all as candidates, but all buttons
will be unselected before you decide. You can change your mind by clicking the button again.
You can vote for as many or as few participants as you want. When you finish voting, click the
Continue button.
<EnC, EC> If some member(s) of the group have previously been excluded, you can only vote
on excluding members of the sub-group you are in. Participants who previously have been
excluded cannot vote for the exclusion of others.
<EnC, EC> If half or more members of the (sub-)group vote to exclude a participant, that
participant will be excluded in future rounds in the current block.
<EnC, EC> After all individuals have made their decisions on exclusion, you will be informed
of the result of the voting and which participants, if any, are excluded. Specifically, you will
be informed about: (i) which members have been excluded (if any); and (ii) for each member,
how many other members s/he voted to exclude.
End of the Instructions
You have now reached the end of these instructions. You still have a chance to go back and reread parts, if you like.
Once you are satisfied that you have fully understood the instructions, you may indicate this
by clicking the 'Ready' button at the bottom of this screen.
After you have indicated that you are ready, we will ask you a few questions regarding the
decisions you will make in the experiment. These questions will help you check whether you
have understood the instructions and will also help to understand the calculation of your
earnings. Once everyone has answered all questions correctly we will begin the experiment.
Quiz Questions I
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions to check your understanding.
You can go back to the instructions by clicking on the menu at the top of the screen.
Fill in the blanks:
This experiment consists of ___ blocks and each block consists of ___ rounds. This means that
there are in total ___ blocks and ___ rounds in this experiment.
Your group of five participants:
o Is the same in all blocks and all rounds
o Changes every block
o Changes every round
Your position:
o Is the same in all blocks and all rounds
o Changes every block
o Changes every round
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<EnC, EC> If you are excluded, you will remain excluded until:
o The end of the experiment
o The end of the block
o The end of the round
Quiz Questions II
In the figures and tables below two possible outcomes of a round are given. These figures and
tables serve only as an example: they are not informative on how you should decide in the
experiment.
Suppose that you are in the North position in both situations. What would be your earnings in
each situation?
<nEnC>
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<EnC>

<EC>
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